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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction under §78-2a-
3(2)(g). Also, the district court apparently sent the appeal to 
the Utah Supreme Court despite the fact that the Notice of Appeal 
indicated the Utah Court of Appeals. The Utah Supreme Court, in 
turn, referred this case to this court stating that Padilla v. 
Board of Pardons, 820 P.2d 473 (Utah 1991), was controlling. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Was Mr. Neel denied the inherent and inalienable right to 
enjoy and defend his liberty guaranteed by Article I, Section 1, of 
the Utah Constitution in that the Utah Board of Pardons procedures 
in effect at his parole hearing denied him assistance of counsel 
and the opportunity to confront the witnesses against him? 
2. Was Mr. Neel denied the right to confront witnesses 
against him and be fully advised of the accusation against him 
contrary to the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
and contrary to Article I, Section 12 of the Utah Constitution in 
that the Board of Pardons refused to allow him to review his Board 
of Pardons file prior to what amounted to a re-sentencing? 
3. Was Mr. Neel denied his Sixth Amendment, Article I, 
Section 12 right to counsel in the course of sentencing by the 
Board of Pardons7 procedures and regulations in effect at the time 
of his July, 1991, parole hearing? 
4. Was Mr. Neel denied due process of law under the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 
1 
7 of the Utah Constitution by the rules and procedures in effect of 
the Board of Pardons applicable to his July, 1991, parole hearing? 
These issues are raised on appeal of the granting of a Motion 
to Dismiss. The standard of review for these issues are that this 
court should construe the Complaint in the light most favorable to 
the plaintiff and to indulge all reasonable inferences in his 
favor. The decision of the district court should be affirmed only 
should it appear to> a certainty that the plaintiff would not be 
entitled to relief under any state of facts which could be proved 
in support of his claims. Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co. , 790 
P.2d 107 (Utah App. 1990). As only issues of law are presented, 
this court need not defer to the trial court's conclusions. 
Stewart v. Utah. 184 Utah Adv. Rep. 77 (Utah App. 1992). 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The verbatim text of the following provisions appear in the 
Addendum: 
Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 
Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; 
Article I, Section 1, Utah Constitution; 
Article I, Section 7, Utah Constitution; 
Article I, Section 12, Utah Constitution; 
Board of Pardons Regulation R655-303; 
Board of Pardons Regulation R655-308; 
§77-27-3 (1982 ed); 
§77-27-11 (1982 ed). 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This action is one in habeas corpus by an inmate at the Utah 
State Prison, David Neel. Mr. Neel is not requesting the court 
order his release. Instead, he is asking that the courts order 
that he receive a fair parole hearing conducted in accordance with 
requirements of the state and federal constitutions. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On October 16, 1991, David Neel filed a Complaint for 
Extraordinary Writ — Habeas Corpus in the Third Judicial District 
Court. A new version of Rule 65B of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure had just gone into effect wherein the State was not 
required to answer until the district court had made an independent 
determination of whether the action could proceed. Despite that 
rule, the State filed an Answer, Response, and Motion to Dismiss. 
Mr. Neel filed a Memorandum in Response to the State's Motion 
to Dismiss and a hearing was held before the Honorable Homer 
Wilkinson on January 3, 1992. The court entered an Order of 
Dismissal of the entire Complaint of Mr. Neel on January 15, 1992. 
This appeal was timely filed on February 18, 1992. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
No trial was held at the district court level to determine 
facts. As this appeal is taken from a Motion to Dismiss, the 
relevant facts which are construed in favor of the petitioner are 
found by reading the Complaint filed by the petitioner. Those 
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facts are summarized next from the Complaint found at Record pp. 2-
19. 
On November 18, 1983, David Neel was sentenced by the Fourth 
Judicial District Court after entering a guilty plea for the 
offense of sexual abuse of a child under §76-5-404.1. Mr. Neel was 
sentenced to a term of five years to life. This offense was at the 
time a first degree felony. The legislature has subsequently 
reduced the nature of the offense to a second degree felony but Mr. 
Neel's sentencing as a first degree felony remained in effect. 
Mr. Neel was committed to the Utah State Prison in Draper, 
Utah. On February 27, 1990, he was paroled to a halfway house in 
Salt Lake City. Unfortunately, on April 6, 1990, Mr. Neel breached 
his parole agreement by walking away from the halfway house. He 
was arrested seven days later in his home state of Pennsylvania. 
No evidence exists of the plaintiff committing any criminal offense 
during his absence except the offense of breaching his parole 
agreement. 
A parole revocation hearing was held before the Utah Board of 
Pardons on July 18, 1990. Mr. Neel pled guilty to the charge of 
parole violation. He was advised by the Board of Pardons at that 
time that a rehearing concerning his parole would be held before 
the full Board in February, 1991. 
The February, 1991, hearing was delayed at the request of the 
Department of Corrections and was not held until July 26, 1991. A 
result of that hearing was to deny the petitioner immediate parole 
and merely reschedule another hearing for August, 1992. 
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During the July 26, 1991, hearing plaintiff had present legal 
counsel to assist him in his presentation. Counsel was denied the 
opportunity to speak in the hearing and was not even allowed upon 
request to sit by the plaintiff. The Board of Pardons invoked 
regulation R655-308 limiting any presentation of the offender to 
himself. 
During the course of the parole hearing, Mr. Neel was advised 
that there were psychological reports and other unidentified 
information contained in his file which he would not be allowed to 
review despite request but which would be considered in making a 
decision concerning his parole. 
Counsel for Mr. Neel made written demand on the Board of 
Pardons for complete access to his file at the Department of 
Corrections so as to be able to examine and prepare a response to 
the material which was being considered in his parole. This 
request appears as Exhibit "E" to the plaintiff's Complaint. 
Record, p. 15. The Board of Pardons responded to the written 
request, contained at Exhibit "F" to the Complaint, with a notice 
that there would be no change in the position of the Board. 
Record, p. 17. 
Mr. Neel then filed his Complaint for Extraordinary Writ — 
Habeas Corpus in the Third Judicial District Court in October, 
1991, asking the district court to order the Utah Board of Pardons 
to conduct a hearing concerning his parole in which he would be 
allowed active representation by counsel and access to information 
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which was being utilized by the Board of Pardons in considering his 
eligibility for parole. Record, p. 2. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Mr. Neel claims that under the indeterminate sentencing system 
in Utah that his parole hearing of July 26, 1991, was actually a 
sentencing proceeding. This sentencing proceeding is a critical 
stage for constitutional purposes to which rights attach under the 
federal and Utah Constitutions. These rights include the right to 
enjoy and defend liberty, the right to confront the witnesses, the 
right to be fully advised of the accusations against him, and his 
due process rights. 
The regulations of the Board of Pardons which deny Mr. Neel 
access to critical information used against him and which denies 
him right to counsel are unconstitutional. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Introduction 
In Foote v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991), the 
Utah Supreme Court recognized due process rights under the federal 
and state Constitutions may attach to proceedings before the Utah 
Board of Pardons. None of those rights were defined in that case 
and remand was done for a hearing as to what rights, if any, Mr. 
Foote had been denied. 
The district court in this case made essentially the same 
mistake as the district court in Foote. That is, questions were 
presented to the court as to whether Mr. Neel had been denied 
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rights in consideration for parole under the U.S. and state 
Constitutions. The district court, without hearing on the facts, 
dismissed Mr. Neel's claims. Fortunately, specific constitutional 
rights were pled in Mr. Neel's Complaint so that this court, upon 
the standard of review of assuming the facts to be as pled in the 
Complaint, may make analysis and rule whether those particular 
constitutional rights are recognized. This is the very kind of 
case which Foote anticipated would be needed to define the body of 
rights one has under indeterminate sentencing. 
B. Legal Framework of Sentencing 
To fully appreciate the deprivation of rights which has 
occurred, one must have firmly in mind the sentencing procedures in 
Utah courts and how they interrelate with the Utah Board of 
Pardons. 
Mr. Neel pled guilty to sexual abuse of a child, a first 
degree felony, under §76-5-404.1 in 1983. He was sentenced under 
§76-3-203 which specifically provides that a felony of the first 
degree carries an "indeterminate term" of not less than five years 
and which may be for life. At the time of his sentencing, the 
Board of Pardons determined the length of actual time to be served. 
See, §77-27-3 and §77-27-11 (1982 ed) in addendum. 
At the time of Mr. Neel's July, 1990, parole hearing, the 
governing law for the Board of Pardons was still Title 77, Chapter 
27. While this Chapter had undergone some revision since Mr. Neel 
was incarcerated, it continued to generally provide for the 
existence of a Board of Pardons and further provide that the Board 
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of Pardons shall determine by majority decision when and under what 
conditions all persons in prison for a felony may be released. 
The Board of Pardons has implemented their responsibilities in 
part by adopting Board of Pardons regulation R655 found in the Utah 
Administrative Code. The regulation provides in R655-303 that all 
information submitted to the Board of Pardons is available for 
review by the offender unless specifically classified as confiden-
tial. R655-308 provides that an offender has a right to assistance 
at a parole hearing but counsel may not speak at a hearing of this 
type. 
The practical effect of the sentencing statutes and of the 
statutes governing the Board of Pardons is that the Utah Board of 
Pardons actually does the sentencing of felony criminal defendants. 
See. Foote v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734 (Utah 1991). 
C. The Right to Defend Liberty Under the 
Utah Constitution Applied to the Parole Hearing. 
The first article of the Utah Constitution is a Declaration of 
Rights. Section 1 specifically provides: 
All men have the inherent and inalienable 
right to enjoy and defend their lives and 
liberties; . . . 
Unfortunately, case law was not found which specifically interprets 
the meaning of this phrase for this or other state constitutions. 
See N.M. Const, art. I, §4; Idaho Const, art. I, §1; Mont. Const. 
art. II, §3. Other cases have considered the meaning of the 
subsequent phrases governing rights of speech and property. It is 
apparent from reading the cases pertaining to these other Section 
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1 rights that the Utah courts have traditionally recognized this 
Section as listing some of the most important and fundamental 
rights that are part of Utah citizenship. See, State v. Interna-
tional Amusements, 565 P.2d 1112 (Utah 1977). The obvious question 
raised in the context of a criminal proceeding is what does it mean 
under the Utah Constitution to have inherent and inalienable rights 
to enjoy and defend liberty? 
In the absence of case law, one may look to other recognized 
sources of authority to interpret this section. Certainly, a 
review of the intent expressed in the constitutional convention is 
an aid to construction. Cooper v. Utah Light & Ry. Co., 35 Utah 
570, 102 P. 202 (1909). Also, rules of construction are helpful. 
These rules include that all language of the constitution should be 
given effect where possible. Hailing v. Industrial Comm'n, 71 Utah 
112, 263 P. 78 (1927). Also, the constitution should be read as a 
whole so that every part is to be given effect, where possible. 
ITT World Communications, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 
693 P.2d 811 (Cal. 1985). 
The way to harmonize article I, section 1 and the entire 
Declaration of Rights while following the rule of construction to 
give effect to language where possible is to hold that the right to 
enjoy and defend liberty at least includes the fundamental rights 
contained in the entire article I. Furthermore, the right to enjoy 
and defend liberty appears to be a broader concept than the 
itemized rights contained in article I. See, Justice Crockett's 
dissent in State v. Piepenbura, 571 P.2d 1299 (Utah 1977). For 
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example, article I, section 7, contains a due process clause which 
implies defending one's liberty is something more than due process 
alone. The logical effect of section 1 is to guarantee to the 
citizens of Utah that article I rights attach whenever liberty is 
threatened. 
There is no question that liberty is threatened under the 
indeterminate sentencing system in which a parole hearing is held. 
The very purpose of the hearing is to determine the act and 
duration of incarceration. 
In summary, article I, section 1 makes a general statement 
that the defense of liberty is a fundamental right of Utah 
citizenship. The first question encountered is when does that 
right attach. The structure of article 1 suggests that the right 
to defend liberty attaches whenever one's liberty is threatened. 
The second question which arises is the scope of the right to 
enjoy and defend liberty. Section 1 does not define the scope, but 
life is given to section 1 by recognizing the Declaration of Rights 
as a whole and applying substantive specific rights out of the 
other sections of article I. 
D. Mr. Neel was Denied His Rights to 
Confront the Witnesses and to be Informed of the 
Accusation Against Him Guaranteed by 
Article I, Section 12. 
Having determined that article I, section 1 applies the 
Declaration of Rights to a parole hearing, Mr. Neel may identify 
his rights under the Utah Constitution denied him by the Board of 
Pardons procedure in effect at the time of his hearing. The first 
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right denied is the article I, section 12 right to confront the 
witnesses against him. Additionally, and closely related, he was 
denied the article I, section 12 right ". . .to demand the nature 
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof. . 
it 
• • 
As alleged in the Complaint, Mr. Neel demanded access to the 
psychological reports being used against him. This request 
constitutes an attempt to exercise his right to have a copy of the 
nature and cause of the accusation against him. This fundamental 
right was recognized long ago in State v. Topham, 41 Utah 39, 123 
P. 888 (1912). The court explained there in the context of an 
indictment that a defendant is entitled to know with reasonable 
certainty with what he is charged so as to be able to protect 
himself. Obviously, a parole hearing is sufficiently analogous 
that the same right would attach. Mr. Neel's parole revocation was 
to be based upon what apparently was contained in the psychological 
reports but he was not ever advised of the conclusions of those 
reports. 
Mr. Neel found himself having to appear to answer conclusions 
reached by psychologists which would not be disclosed to him other 
than they apparently justified a reversal of the earlier conclusion 
he was substantively worthy of release. This inmate found himself 
in the position of no assistance of counsel, responding to substan-
tive conclusions of experts, and having no resources to make a 
response. The procedure utilized by the Board of Pardons in 
refusing to supply the information to Mr. Neel offends reasonable 
11 
notions of justice and certainly is against the intent of the 
Declaration of Rights. 
Not only was Mr. Neel denied the right to have a copy of the 
nature of the accusation against him as guaranteed by section 12, 
but the Board procedures in effect at the time of his hearing did 
not allow him to confront those making the conclusions as guaran-
teed by section 12. In I Proceedings, Constitutional Convention 
306, et seq. (March 23, 1895), the Utah Constitutional Convention 
considered the use of depositions in criminal proceedings as part 
of the debate concerning article I, section 12. That discussion, 
not repeated here, shows that a recognized fundamental right under 
the Utah Constitution was that witnesses be subject to cross-
examination. Indeed, it was stated that there could be "no fair 
defense" without that right. Face to face confrontation of the 
witnesses was extolled as the only way to have a fair trial. 
Taking into account that the United States Constitution also 
guarantees confrontation of the witnesses, one is hard pressed to 
find a more fundamental right which should attach. The question 
again presented is whether that right attaches in the parole 
hearing context. As explained above, article I, section 1 has the 
effect of attaching the Declaration of Rights to whenever liberty 
is threatened. 
This court has recognized that a presentence report should be 
disclosed to a defendant in order to allow an adequate opportunity 
to respond. State v. Sweat, 722 P. 2d 746 (Utah 1986); State v. 
Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241 (Utah 1980). The psychological reports used 
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here can be analogized to a presentence report to a trial judge. 
The same importance attaches because the information is utilized to 
determine an appropriate term in prison. This information arises 
solely out of the state's effort and may not be independently 
learned by the inmate assuming he had the resources to do so. 
The circumstances in which Mr. Neel finds himself is that he 
was found to be suitable for release into the community. When he 
was no longer being punished for having walked away from the 
halfway house, his extension of sentence became not additional 
punishment for what he did, but shifted to punishing him for what 
the state believes him to be. He cannot fairly challenge this 
resentencing without knowing what the state claims him to be 
psychologically so that he may present a fair defense. 
The failure to allow Mr. Neel to confront the additional 
information contained in his Board of Pardons file constitutes a 
denial of the right to confront witnesses which ought to be 
remedied by this court declaring the Board of Pardons procedures to 
be unconstitutional and ordering a new hearing held which comports 
with article I, section 12. 
E. Mr. Neel was Denied His Right 
to Counsel Under Article I, Section 12* 
The failure of the Board of Pardons to allow counsel to defend 
the sentencing of Mr. Neel deprives him of the right to enjoy and 
defend his liberty. As this court is well aware, there is a Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel at all critical stages in the criminal 
prosecution. Arsenault v. Massachusetts, 393 U.S. 5 (1968). 
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Critical stage has been defined as any stage where counsel's 
absence might derogate from the accused's right to a fair proceed-
ing. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). This fundamental 
right to counsel appears in the Utah Constitution in article I, 
section 12. The question presented, therefore, is whether 
sentencing under our indeterminate sentencing system constitutes a 
critical stage for which the right to counsel attaches under both 
the United States and Utah Constitutions. 
Sentencing is a critical stage of the criminal proceeding. 
State v. Casarezr 6f>6 P.2d 1005 (Utah 1982). Under our indetermi-
nate sentencing system, the Board of Pardons presides over the 
sentencing procedure. It follows naturally that the right to 
counsel should attach whenever the Board of Pardons seeks to impose 
what amounts to a sentence on the defendant. Counsel should have 
been allowed to defend on the resentencing and Rule R655-308 is 
unconstitutional for denying that right. 
F. Due Process was Denied Mr. Neel 
Article I, section 7 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that no 
person may be deprived of liberty without due process of law. Both 
the United States Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Utah have 
held that a prisoner does not have a right of expectation of parole 
to which due process rights attach. Greenholtz v. Inmates, 442 
U.S. 1 (1979); Hatch v. Deland, 790 P.2d 49 (Utah App. 1990). 
These cases were presented to the district court by the state in 
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support of the argument that Mr. Neel has few, if any, rights in a 
parole hearing. Record, pp. 36 - 37. 
In fact, these cases are not helpful to this court under the 
circumstances presented here. The courts there did not consider 
the implication of an indeterminate sentencing system whereby the 
focus of a parole hearing is not whether the prisoner should be 
released but, instead, actually an act of sentencing wherein the 
focus is how long should the prisoner be held. The distinction is 
important because, as explained above, an act of sentencing is a 
critical stage to which all constitutional rights attach while the 
act of parole is an act of grace by the state to which rights do 
not attach. 
As explained in State v. Wilcox, 808 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1991), a 
basic element of due process is that the defendant be given 
adequate notice of the offense with which he is charged so that a 
proper defense can be made. See, also, Christiansen v. Harris, 163 
P.2d 314 (Utah 1945). The heart of the Complaint of Mr. Neel is 
that psychological evaluation information was contained in a file 
utilized by the Board of Pardons to continue his incarceration, but 
he was not given opportunity to examine it. He knows only the 
general conclusion that the information was not only adverse but 
sufficiently adverse to justify reversal of the earlier decision to 
release him. One cannot reasonably conclude that he had adequate 
notice of the basis of the sentencing act by the Board of Pardons 
when he does not know what it is upon which the Board relies. 
15 
The regulations promulgated by the Board of Pardons denying 
access to confidential information did not allow Mr. Neel fundamen-
tal fairness in learning why he was to held in prison longer after 
he had been found once eligible for parole. This fundamental 
unfairness should be remedied by this court ordering another 
hearing meeting the requirements of article I, section 7 and the 
Fifth Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
The Utah Board of Pardons found Mr. Neel substantively ready 
for release on February 27, 1990. By the time of his parole 
hearing on July 26, 1991, he was no longer being punished for 
having walked away from the halfway house, but was told by the 
Board of Pardons that he was no longer fit for release into the 
community. The only thing that changed on the substantive question 
of his fitness for release were, apparently, some psychological 
reports which he was not allowed to see. Mr. Neel was asked to 
defend himself without assistance of counsel and without knowing 
what had changed. He was, in effect, sentenced to a longer term 
without any of the rights which usually attach under the Utah and 
United States Constitutions to one being sentenced. 
This court is respectfully requested to declare the regula-
tions of the Utah Board of Pardons unconstitutional so far as they 
deny one in a hearing to determine the length of the sentence the 
right to examine the information used against him and to have 
assistance of counsel. The court is further requested to order 
that Mr. Neel be allowed a hearing before the Utah Board of Pardons 
16 
in which he has had opportunity to examine all information used to 
justify the length of his incarceration, opportunity to confront or 
rebut that information, and assistance of counsel of his choice. 
DATED this ffr*' day of May, 1992. 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
GREGORY J^'^ANDE'RS, ESQ. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
17 
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ADDENDUM A 
PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
LORENZO K. MILLER (5761) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant 
6100 South 300 East, Suite 204 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 265-5638 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID A NEEL, 
Plaintiff, : ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
v. : 
Case No, 910906541 
TAMARA HOLDEN, et al^, : 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Defendants. : 
The above entitled matter having come before this Court 
on January 3, 1992, on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff 
was present and represented by Gregory J. Sanders, and Defendants 
was represented by Lorenzo K. Miller, Assistant Attorney General. 
This Court having heard oral argument from both parties and 
having made its ruling, it is hereby ORDERED as follows: 
1. Defendant's motion to dismiss is granted. 
cy-
FI153 §?2S'T*><^^"*T 
JAN 1 6 1992 
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«--?'»yCterfi 
00078 
2. Petitioner's complaint for extraordinary writ of 
habeas corpus is dismissed as meritless. 
DATED this day of January, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
/ HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
/ Third District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that an unsigned copy of the foregoing 
Order of Dismissal was mailed, postage prepaid, to Gregory J. 
Sanders, attorney for plaintiff, City Centre I,. #330, 175 East 
400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314, this jf^day of 
January, 1992. 
,s?P 
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ADDENDUH B 
77-27-3. Duties of board — Decisions final — Governor's power — 
Restitution as condition. (1) The board of pardons shall determine, by 
majority decision, when and under what conditions, subject to the provi-
sions of this chapter, persons now or hereafter serving sentences, in all 
cases except treason or impeachments, or as otherwise limited by law, may 
be released upon parole, pardoned, or have their fines or forfeitures 
remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated. No fine or forfeiture 
shall be remitted, no parole, pardon or commutation granted or sentence 
terminated, except after a full hearing before the board in open session 
and after appropriate prior notice to the defendant of the time and place 
of the hearing has been given. The orders and decisions of the board of 
pardons and any dissent thereto shall be reduced to writing. 
(2) The determinations and decisions of the board of pardons in cases 
involving approval or denial of any action whatsoever, of paroles, pardons, 
commutations or terminations of sentence, or remission of fines and forfei-
tures shall be final. 
(3) Nothing herein shall be construed as a denial of or limitation on 
the governor's power to grant respites or reprieves in all cases of convic-
tions for offenses against the state, except treason or conviction on 
impeachment; however, such respites or reprieves shall not extend beyond 
the next session of the board of pardons and the board, at such session, 
shall continue or determine such respite or reprieve, or it may commute 
the punishment, or pardon the offense as herein provided. In the case of 
conviction for treason, the governor has the power to suspend execution 
of the sentence, until the case shall be reported to the legislature at its 
next session, when the legislature shall either pardon or commute the sen-
tence, or direct its execution. 
In determining when and where and under what conditions persons now 
or hereafter serving sentences may be released upon parole, pardoned or 
have their fines or forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or 
terminated, the state board of pardons shall consider whether such persons 
have made or are prepared to make restitution as ascertained in accord-
ance with the standards and procedures of section 76-3-201, as a condition 
of any parole, pardon, remission of fines or forfeitures, commutation or ter-
mination of sentence. 
If the state board of pardons determines that restitution is inappropri-
ate, the state board of pardons shall state in writing as a part of the record 
of proceedings, the reasons for the decision. 
(4) Whenever the state board of pardons orders the release on parole 
of an inmate who has been sentenced to make restitution pursuant to sec-
tion 76-3-201, but with respect to whom payment of all or a portion of the 
restitution was suspended until his release from imprisonment, the board 
may establish a schedule by which payment of the restitution may be 
resumed. In fixing the schedule and supervising the paroled inmate's per-
formance thereunder the board may consider the factors specified in sec-
tion 76-3-201 (3). The board may provide to the sentencing court a copy 
of the schedule and any modifications thereof. 
77-27-11. Power of board to pardon or parole prisoner or terminate 
his sentence — Determination of date prisoner eligible for parole. (1) 
The board of pardons may pardon or parole any prisoner or commute or 
terminate the sentence of any prisoner imprisoned in a state prison or a 
county jail, unless otherwise provided by law. 
(2) The board shall determine, within six months after the date of a 
prisoner's commitment, the date upon which he shall be released on parole 
or upon which his case shall be considered and shall promptly inform him 
of the board's decision. 
ADDENDUM C 
R655-303. Offender Access to Informa* 
tion. 
R655-303-1. Policy. 
R655-303-2. Procedure. 
R655-303-1. Policy. 
An offender shall have access to all information 
relating to his case on which parole decisions are 
made except that which is classified confidential. 
R655-303-2. Procedure. 
All material submitted to the Board, except that 
which is specifically classified as confidential, shall 
be available to be reviewed with the offender. 
The Board may review the offender's record and 
cover areas of concern during the hearing. The of' 
fender may comment, clarify issues and ask questions 
at the hearing. 
Upon written request from the offender, copies of 
requested information not classified as confidential 
shall be provided at the offender's expense. 
R655-308. Offender Hearing Assis-
tance. 
R655-308-1. Policy. 
R655-308-2. Procedure. 
R655-308-1. Policy. 
It is the policy of the Board of Pardons to allow an 
offender to have such assistance from other persons 
as may be required in preparation for a Board hear-
ing. 
R655-308-2. Procedure. 
Family, friends, professionals, interpreters, case 
workers, and minority representatives are allowed to 
be present at hearings and may assist the offender in 
preparing his case. 
An attorney shall be retained by the State to repre-
sent all parolees who desire representation at Parole 
Revocation hearings before the Board of Pardons. 
However, an alleged parole violator may choose to 
have a private attorney represent him at his own ex-
pense. 
Except as otherwise provided by law, no person 
other than the offender may address the Board at any 
hearing except for the offender's attorney at a Parole 
Revocation hearing, or such persons as the Board 
may find necessary to the orderly conducting of any 
hearing. 
ADDENDUM D 
AMENDMENT V 
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process 
of law and just compensation clauses.] 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases 
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in 
time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same 
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any 
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for 
public use, without just compensation. 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the 
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusa-
tion; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory 
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of 
counsel for his defence. 
ARTICLE I 
DECLARATION OF 
RIGHTS 
Section Section 
1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 15. [Freedom of speech and of the press — Li-
2. [All political power inherent in the people.] bel.] 
3. [Utah inseparable from the Union.]
 16> [ N o imprisonment for debt — Exception.] 
4. [Religious liberty - No property qualifies-
 1 7 [Elections to be free - Soldiers voting.] 
* rw K ? ° r J 18' [Attainder - Ex post facto laws - Impair-
5. [Habeas corpus.] r . . , r 
6. [Right to bear arms.]
 1Q _ ?* T £lr i 
7. [Due process of law.] J9- £ * a s o n d e [ m e ? ~ * « » « 
8. [Offenses bailable.] 20- [Military subordinate to the civil power.] 
9. [Excessive bail and fines — Cruel punish- 21. [Slavery forbidden.) 
ments.] 22. [Private property for public use.] 
10. [Trial by jury.] 23. [Irrevocable franchises forbidden.] 
11. [Courts open — Redress of injuries.] 24. [Uniform operation of laws.] 
12. [Rights of accused persons.] 25. [Rights retained by people.] 
13. [Prosecution by information or indictment 26. [Provisions mandatory and prohibitory.] 
— Grand jury.] 27. [Fundamental rights.] 
14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden — Issu-
ance of warrant.] 
Section 1. [Inherent and inalienable rights.] 
All men have the inherent and inalienable right to eryoy and defend their 
lives and liberties; to acquire, possess and protect property; to worship accord-
ing to the dictates of their consciences; to assemble peaceably, protest against 
wrongs, and petition for redress of grievances; to communicate freely their 
thoughts and opinions, being responsible for the abuse of that right. 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
ona°wPerS°n Sha11 b e d e p r i v e d 0 f l i f e ' l i b e r t * o r P«>Perty, without due process 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
instance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the Jt day of May, 1992, I caused 
four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to 
be mailed, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Paul Van Dam, Esq. 
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Lorenzo K. Miller, Esq. 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
6100 South 300 East, Suite 204 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
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